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Abstract 
In this paper, the basic assumption is that the environment provides two different 
kinds of services. First, the environment may serve as an input to the production of 
conventional goods. For example, the exploitation of an oil source from which one 
firm extracts the oil which in turn is used as a fossil fuel for an industry. In the worst 
case, the use of the environment for industrial purposes will negatively affect the 
environment, e.g. the water quality of a paper mill along a river. Nevertheless, the 
possibility to pollute, i.e., to save abatement costs, lowers production costs. Hence, 
firms and consumers evaluate this service positively. Second, the environment itself-
clean air, natural creeks and rivers instead of paper mills, hydro power plants, etc.-
provides amenities and thus a second service that is different, because enjoying this 
service does not degrade environmental quality. As it is intuitively clear, the 
environment provides consumptive and non-consumptive uses. In renewable 
resources means, the environmental stock may be harvested and used as an input for 
conventional goods’ production but provides simultaneously a positive externality. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the dynamics of pollution and the possibility of 
cycles and instability, while the major finding of this paper is the following: Taking 
the simplest pollution model with one state and one control variables and extending it 
into two state variables, equilibrium may change from the fixed point into a limit 
cycle equilibrium, i.e. the optimal emissions rate may be cyclical. 
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1. Introduction 
Analyzing pollution control issues for developed and developing countries has 
become an important multi–disciplinary topic. Since the design of efficient action 
against pollution has to take into consideration the intertemporal response of victims, 
dynamic modeling can be used as an appropriate tool. In this paper we make two 
basic assumptions. The first is that the environment provides two different kinds of 
services. i.e., the environment may serve as an input to the production of conventional 
goods and second, the environment itself provides amenities. In the second 
assumption the damage function is depending on the intensity of emissions and on the 
intensity of abatement as well. We use both optimal control and differential game 
approaches to study the intertemporal strategic interactions between the polluters and 
the social planer. 
The pollutants accumulation is a major problem in our world and finding a 
way to effectively reduce, while maintaining the standards of the production process, 
is a great challenge facing capitalistic societies. The clean environment is obviously a 
public good. Conversely, all the “dirty” production process that creates pollutants 
accumulation, e.g. emissions caused by uncontrolled production, constitutes a public 
bad. But which of the factors of production process generates pollutants? Clearly 
uncontrolled, with respect to the environment, production involves antiquated 
equipment that emits more than permissible and therefore constitutes a polluters’ “bad 
weapon”. It is a usual phenomenon the old production equipment - which used to be 
the main production equipment for the Western developed countries - to change hands 
moving to the Southern or Eastern developing countries at a low acquisition cost. 
Similarly, all the extracted depletable resources which are used as inputs in the 
production are sources of pollution. The power of such a “dirty” production process 
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rests upon the accumulation of a stock of resources, consequently depending on the 
financial capital for these resources that emits more and therefore accumulates 
pollutants.  
On the other hand, in early days of applications of dynamic systems to 
economic problems, it was recognized that the optimal solution of infinite time 
problems may be characterized by multiple equilibrium points. Finding multiple 
equilibrium points in economic models is not an attractive solution for the policy 
makers. But the recognition of multiple optimal stable equilibria may be crucial in 
order to locate the thresholds separating the basins of attraction surrounding these 
different equilibria. Starting at a threshold, a rational economic agent is indifferent 
between moving toward one or the other equilibrium, but a small movement away 
from the threshold can “destroy” this indifference, leading in a unique optimal course 
of action.  
Since the introductory one sector, with a convex – concave production 
function, optimal growth model of Skiba (Skiba, 1978), there has been a lot of 
progress towards the cyclical solution strategies generated in intertemporal dynamic 
economic models. Wirl (1995) exploring the optimality of cyclical exploitation of 
renewable resources stocks, reconsidering a model of Clark et al (1979), concludes 
that equilibrium that falls below the maximum sustainable yield but that exceeds the 
intertemporal harvest rule due to the positive spillovers allows for optimal, long run, 
cyclical harvest strategies.  
Limit cycles, according to Poincare–Bendixson condition (Hartman, 1982) 
which also restricted in planar systems, has the intuitive explanation which says that if 
a trajectory of a continuous dynamical system stays in a bounded region forever, it 
has to approach “something”. This “something” is either a point or a cycle. So if it is 
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not a point, then it must be a cycle. This gives rise to cyclical policies in economic 
models, e.g. if a policy trajectory, say an abatement pollution policy, is restricted in a 
bounded planar space then this policy sooner or later will retrace its previous steps.   
The Poincare–Andronov–Hopf theorem (Kuznetsov, 2004), which applies in a 
higher than the two dimensional systems, gives sufficient conditions for the existence 
of limit cycles of nonlinear dynamical systems. Informally, one can think of this 
theorem as requiring that equilibrium must suddenly change from a sink to a source 
with variation of a parameter. Arithmetically this requires that a pair of purely 
imaginary eigenvalues exists for a particular value of the bifurcation parameter and 
that the real part of this pair of eigenvalues changes smoothly its sign as the parameter 
is altered from below its actual value to above.  
Hence, analogously to equilibrium, the stability of limit cycles is of great 
importance for the long run behavior of a dynamical system. But since the existence 
and therefore stability of a limit cycle is highly dependent on an arbitrarily chosen 
bifurcation parameter we have to deal with the qualitative analysis of such a problem. 
Economic mechanisms that may be a source of limit cycles, as mentioned by Dockner 
and Feichtinger (1995) are: (i) complementarity over time, (ii) dominated cross effects 
with respect to capital stocks, and (iii) positive growth of equilibrium. 
The main contribution of the paper is twofold: First, it considers the 
environment as a renewable resource for which the environmental quality grows with 
the pollutants abatement but reduces with the damages stemming from pollutants 
accumulation which in turn are treated as a stock. Having the two states, i.e. the 
environmental quality as a stock and the stock of pollutants the benevolent social 
planer has to steer the control variable, i.e. the emissions, in an optimal way between 
the two states, and this setting gives rise for complex polices especially for limit 
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cycles. Second, it considers the pollution problem, as a differential game in which two 
players involved. The first player is the polluting representative producer which 
maximizes his own utility stemming from emissions while the second player is every 
enjoyer of the environmental services, maximizing his own utility derived from the 
clean environment and from the pollutants abatement as well. 
In both cases, we explore the Nash equilibrium and especially we investigate 
the existence of limit cycles and consequently the existence of cyclical strategies of 
the instrument variables. Moreover, in a state separable game model setup we found 
the analytical expressions of the strategies which are time consistent. The 
environmental pollution control game takes place between the government, acting as 
the social planer, and polluters for which the resources used in production accumulate 
pollutants. Such pollutants accumulation and regulation control models can be found, 
among others, in Forster (1980) concerning optimal energy use model; in Xepapadeas 
(1992) regarding environmental policy design and non-point source pollution; in 
Mäler et al (2007) in the shallow lake game; in F.Wirl (1995) and so on. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
social planer’s optimal control model and gives a necessary condition for cyclical 
strategies. Section 3 investigates the differential game between the government and 
the polluter and calculates the Nash equilibrium strategies and the players’ value 
functions. Section 4 explores the limit cycle equilibrium of the management model, 
while section 5 introduces and solves analytically the proposed differential game. The 
last section concludes the paper.   
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2. The pollution management model 
As it is known the production process accumulates pollutants and therefore all the 
owners of the productive assets, called the polluters, are always to some degree 
subject to emissions constraints such that too low levels of pollutants will topple the 
regime. Of course, the precise magnitude depends on several international treaties e.g. 
the Kyoto or Montreal protocols, as well as on the inshore’s institutions. However, 
even in development industrial countries a level below 50% mark is beneficial 
because of two things: first, the low level of pollutants per se provides fringe benefits, 
in the sense of a good reputation, and second discretionary power increases if the 
pollutants are abated, therefore the consumers will trust the abating firms. In the 
model below we introduce the function ( )V X   which captures all kinds of benefits of 
a good environmental state such that ( )V X  may become very negative if pollutants 
exceed a certain threshold.  
Given the pollutants generating nature of production and the benefits accrued form 
a clean environment, the social planer of an economy has to steer very carefully in the 
Bosporus narrow passage and this trade off may involve complex patterns over time, 
in particular, limit cycles. Formally, the social planer maximize the intertemporal 
benefits (and the implicit trade off) from a good as possible environmental state, by 
X we denote the environmental state, and from emissions, E  denotes emissions in 
the production process. These two types of benefits are separable, 
( )( ) ( )( )U E t V X t+ , in order to simplify the analysis and both utility functions are 
increasing and concave: 0U ′ > , 0U ′′ < ; 0V ′> , 0V ′′ ≤ . The emissions can be 
abated, i.e. its rate becomes negative such that the central planer, in order to maintain 
a clean environment, engages in a crusade against pollution. This modeling of a soft 
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constraint through the function of V  instead of considering hard constraints 
( )X t X≥ ɶ 1 is chosen for three reasons. First, a hard constraint imposes a 
lexicographic preference ordering upon the environment which seems implausible. 
Second, the state of environment over and above the required threshold offers further 
and different kinds of benefits: a good state of the environment itself may be 
desirable, i.e. a consumption good; a high state offers to the central planer 
considerable discretion and so on. Third, this formulation guarantees smoothness of 
the solution and thus simplifies the analysis. Moreover, sufficient smoothness is a 
requisite to apply Hopf bifurcation theorem. 
After all, the social planer faces the following problem: 
                    
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
0
max t
E t
e U E t V X t dtρ
∞
−  +  ∫
           
( )1  
subject to ( ) ( )X A X D S= −ɺ
                                        
( )2  
                 S E Sδ= −ɺ          ( )3  
E  are emissions 
S  is the stock of pollutants 
X  is the state or quality of the environment 
( )A X  is the growth of environmental quality, the natural replenishment or abatement 
( )D S  are the loses or damages in environmental amenities depending on the 
pollution stock. In another way the same function should be the amount of input used 
by the industry. 
Maximization of (1) is subject to two dynamic constraints. First, the state of 
environment is a dynamic process, here is a diffusion process according to (2) – 
                                                          
1
 Where Xɶ  identifies the minimal state of the environment 
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which is negatively affected by damages of environmental state, e.g. by the stock of 
pollutants S . However, environmental state is affected, by the large, not only from the 
isolated emissions but from the cumulative pollutants. The accumulated pollutants, 
according to differential equation (3), obey to the natural purification law, i.e. they 
have the exponential declining factor 0δ≥ . 
The function ( )A X  may represent an arbitrary, but concave ( )0A′′ <  
process ( ) ( )1A X X X= − . In the present model ( )A X rather represents the 
abatement. This specification is chosen because of its wide use in the literature, its 
plausibility and its convenience, but is not crucial for the model. Logistic growth, first 
proposed by Verhulst (1845), arising from the more general equation 
( )1 sign 1ax rx x K x K= − −ɺ , where r  the intrinsic growth, K the carrying capacity 
and a  a positive constant playing the role of the penalty in a population model. Gatto 
et al. (1988) prove the optimality of the logistic growth function in both linear ( 1a= ) 
and nonlinear ( 1a≠ ) cases, and draw the optimal trajectories in both cases. 
Following population growth models it can be shown (Gatto et al, 1988), in absence 
of pollution, the optimal growth of environmental state is logistic. That is, since the 
abatement must be equivalent to the optimal growth, this function could be the 
logistic, i.e. abatement could be in the form: ( ) ( )1A X X X= −  
The function ( )D S  measures the environmental degradation depending on the 
pollutants accumulation S . Thus, 0D′>  and we assume additionally, and quite 
plausibly,  0D′′> . Equation ( )3 is the standard equation of pollutants motion used in 
environmental models (see for example Dockner and Long, 1993). 
In the solution process, we define the Hamiltonian (omitting arguments) 
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                      ( ) ( )H U V A D E Sλ µ δ= + + − + −              ( )4  
,   λ µ  are the costate variables of the states X  and S  respectively. 
The Hamiltonian is concave in states and control, because the objective, as well as the 
state transition equations are concave, and the costate variable λ  must be positive. 
The Hamiltonian maximizing condition w.r.t. the control ( )E t , i.e. w.r.t. the 
emissions, is the following: 
0EH U µ′= + =        ( )5  
and it is assumed that an interior solution exists, which is already the general case 
owing to the strict concavity of the Hamiltonian with respect to E , i.e. 
( ) 0EEH U E′′= < . 
We record the above result in a proposition.
 
 
Proposition 1: In the two states pollution management model (1)–(3) the equilibrium 
conditions are unaffected compared with the one state model, i.e., the intertemporal 
optimality requires the marginal utility from emissions equals to the negative of the 
shadow price of the pollutants stock. 
Proof 
Follows immediately from the optimality condition ( )5  
Now, the following two equations determine the evolution of adjoints ,   λ µ . 
( )A Vλ ρ λ′ ′= − −ɺ           ( )6  
( ) Dµ ρ δ λ ′= + +ɺ        ( )7  
The optimality conditions ( ) ( )5 7−  are valid only if additionally the limiting 
transversality conditions are satisfied: 
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( ) ( )lim 0t
t
e t X tρ λ−
→∞
=        ( )8  
( ) ( )lim 0t
t
e t S tρ µ−
→∞
=        ( )9  
3. Stability analysis 
For interior solutions the Hamiltonian maximizing condition allow to replace the 
control variable ( )E t  by a function h , ( ) ( ),   1 0E h h Uµ ′ ′′= = − > , and the 
optimality conditions ( )5  – ( )9  lead to the following system of canonical equations in 
state ( ),X S and costate ( ),λ µ variables: 
( ) ( )X A X D S= −ɺ                    ( )10.1  
( )S h Sµ δ= −ɺ        ( )10.2  
( )( ) ( )A X V Xλ ρ λ′ ′= − −ɺ       ( )10.3  
( ) ( )D Sµ ρ δ λ ′= + +ɺ       ( )10.4  
The Jacobian of the system ( ) ( )10.1 10.4−  evaluated at the equilibrium is given by the 
following matrix: 
     
X X X S X X
S X S S S S
J
X S
X S
λ µ
λ µ
λ λ λ λ λ µ
µ µ µ λ µ µ
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
ɺ ɺ ɺ ɺ
ɺ ɺ ɺ ɺ
ɺ ɺ ɺ ɺ
ɺ ɺ ɺ ɺ
 
     
( ) ( )
( )
0 0
0 0 1
      
0 0
0
A D
U
V A V A A
V D A D
δ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ δ
 ′ ′− 
 ′′− − =  ′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′− − − − 
 ′ ′′ ′ ′− +  
 ( )11  
The following Dockner’s formula (Dockner, 1985) computes the four eigenvalues iξ , 
1,2,3,4i=  of the Jacobian ( )11  which are crucial to characterize the local dynamics 
of the canonical system ( )10  
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        ( ) ( ) ( )2 211,2,3,4 22 2 2 4det Jξ ρ ρ= ± − Ψ ± Ψ −    ( )12  
coefficient Ψ  is the following sum 
      2
X XS SX X
SSX
SX S
µµλ
µ µλ λ λ λ
µλ µ
∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂
∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂Ψ = + +
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
ɺ ɺɺ ɺɺ ɺ
ɺ ɺ ɺ ɺɺ ɺ
    ( )13  
and the determinant is: 
( )( ) ( )
2 2
det   
A V D D V D A V
J A A
U A U U
δ ρ δ ρ
ρ
′′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′
′ ′= − + + + +
′′ ′ ′′ ′′−
  ( )14  
( ) ( ) ( )( )A A D V U Aρ δ δ ρ ρ′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′Ψ = − − + + −
    
( )15  
Following Dockner (1985), for the saddle point stability it suffice det 0J >  and 
0Ψ<  conditions which satisfied, only if the abatement function is decreasing, i.e. 
0A′ < . The above result is recorded as follows. 
 
Proposition 2. In the pollution management model (1)–(3), the saddle point stability 
is ensured only if the abatement function is a decreasing one, 0A′ < .  
Proof 
Follows immediately from ( )14  and ( )15  for 0A′ <  and also taking the concavity 
assumptions of the utility functions. 
 
More complex results are possible in the case of increasing abatement 
( ) 0A X′ > . If ( )ˆ0 A X ρ′< < , then there occurs a transition from a domain of stable 
to locally unstable spirals and this transition give birth to limit cycles. Precisely 
condition 0A′ =  (or equivalently the point Xˆ ), separates the domain of stable 
policies from the domain where possible complexities arise. In fact, the supposition of 
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growth, ( ) 0A X′ >  for ˆX X< , is crucial. Supposing that abatement follows the 
diffusion process for the environmental state with one and only one point Xˆ , such 
that ( )ˆ 0A X′ = , the implication is that the time path of the environmental state 
consists of a convex segment (if ˆX X< ) and a concave segment (if ˆX X> ), with 
respect to time.  
A(X) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Unstable spirals                 saddle point 
                              Limit cycle                          stability 
                              Saddle point 
                              instability 
 
 
 
                                                                          Xˆ                                                X 
Figure 1: Properties of equilibrium depending on environmental state. 
 
This in turn implies that the domain of low quality environmental state ˆX X<  
exhibits increasing returns and the domain of high environmental state quality 
exhibits diminishing returns. While diminishing returns (i.e. a point lying inside the 
concave segment) it is plausible to lead to stable equilibrium, increasing returns to 
environmental state lead to cycles. This is because a low quality environmental state 
may increase to certain threshold so it may be rational for the polluters to lower 
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production and therefore the pollutants accumulation. The following figure shows the 
segments for which the two different kinds of equilibrium taking place. 
4. Exploring the limit cycle equilibrium  
We specify quadratic benefits from the high environmental state, the same 
quadratic form for the utility arising from emissions and a linear function for the 
damages stemming from pollutants accumulation, i.e.: 
( ) 211 22U E a E a E= −         ( )16.1  
( ) 211 22V X X Xβ β= −       ( )16.2  
( ) ( )1A X X X= −        ( )16.3  
( )D S Sγ=         ( )16.4  
Equations ( )16.1  and ( )16.2  represent the fact that a high quality level of environment 
exists toward which environmental quality, X , grows in the absence of pollution, 
while the decline in environmental quality is proportional to the accumulated level of 
pollutants S . 
Assuming that the natural purification rate of the accumulated stock of 
pollutants is equal to zero, i.e., 0δ= , yielding *ˆ 0E =  in the long run equilibrium. 
Additionally we assume 2 0V β′′ =− = in order to ease the analysis that follows. 
Thus, in determinant ( )14  the only term that remains is the second, which remains and 
in coefficient ( )15  as well. Then, the final expressions for the Jacobian and coefficient 
respectively, are: 
( ) ( )
22
1
2
2
det   
A V D
J
U A a A
β γ
ρ ρ
′′ ′ ′
= =
′′ ′ ′− −
    
( )14 ′  
 ( )A Aρ′ ′Ψ = −
      
( )15 ′
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  For any equilibrium satisfying ( )ˆ0 A X ρ′< < ,   ( )14 ′  as well as  ( )15 ′  is 
positive. According to Grass et al (2008) the condition for limit cycle equilibrium, i.e., 
the existence of purely imaginary roots, requires the following relation 
2
2det   0
2 2
J ρ
 Ψ Ψ− − =  
     ( )17                                        
Given the parameter values as in the following table 
1a  2a  
γ  ρ  δ  
1 1 0.071 1 0 
 
and choosing the parameter 1β  as the bifurcation parameter, there exist a unique 
equilibrium at: 
( ) 21 1 17 1 7 100ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , , , , , 1
200 2 400 7
X S λ µ β β β
 = − −   
 
Now relation ( )17  becomes the following quartic equation in 1β  
             2 3 41 1 1 1
7 7 49 343 2401
0
50 20 40000 2000000 400000000
β β β β− + + − =  
for which the solution is: 
( )1 1,2,3,4 6.6910;   7.5947;    15.4403;    29.7260β = −    ( )18  
and only the two first values for 1β  are acceptable, since 1β  is positive and ( )ˆ 0,1X ∈ . 
Moreover, at these critical parameters both det J  and Ψ  are positive, i.e., one pair of 
purely imaginary roots exists. The final result is, for the intermediate values of the 
bifurcation parameter ( )1 6.6910  ,  7.5947β ∈ , the existence of complex eigenvalues 
all with positive real part. 
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Again following Grass et al (2008) one can draw the limit cycle with above 
values of the parameter 1β . Moreover, it can be proved numerically the existence of a 
two dimensional stable manifold of a limit cycle and the existence of a “strong” 
unstable manifold explaining some inaccurate results of the IVP approach. 
5. The differential game model 
In the second part of the paper we make the assumption that the damage function 
of environmental quality is a function of the intensity of emissions and as well as a 
function of the intensity of the abatement process. 
Let us denote by ( )X t  the instantaneous state of environment at time t . 
Without any damages caused by pollution and also without any actions undertaken by 
the polluters the stock of environmental quality grows according to the function 
( )G X . This function is considered as growth function, obviously dependent on the 
state of environment, satisfying the conditions ( ) ( )0 0,  0G G X= >  for all 
( )0,X K∈ , ( ) 0G X <  for all ( ),X K∈ ∞ , ( ) 0G X′′ ≤ . Carrying out emissions is 
costly for the polluters, e.g. compliance costs and damages in their equipment which 
reduces their capital available to the production process. This clearly affects 
negatively the utility of the polluters.  
However, the reduction of the growth of the environmental quality stock, does 
not only depend on the intensity of emissions ( )u t , but is also influenced by the 
counter pollution measures ( )v t  undertaken by the government or by any group of 
agents e.g. volunteers they fight against pollution. We set as instrument variables for 
both sides the intensity of emissions ( )u t  and abatement effort ( )v t , which are 
assumed non-negatives ( ) ( )0,    0u t tν≥ ≥ . 
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We denote by ( ),uφ ν  the function that affects the growth of environmental 
quality. Combining the growth ( )G X  with the function ( ),uφ ν  the state dynamics 
can be written as 
         ( ) ( ),X G X uφ ν= −ɺ ,    ( ) 00 0X X= >                                     (19) 
Along a trajectory the non negativity constraint is imposed, i.e.  
( ) 0     0X t t≥ ∀ ≥                                                            (20) 
With the assumption that a higher intensity of emissions leads to stronger reduction of 
the environmental quality and therefore we assume the partial derivative w.r.t 
emissions of the damage function ( ),uφ ν  to be positive, i.e. 0uφ > . Moreover the 
law of diminishing returns is applied only for the emission realizations, i.e. 0uuφ < , 
while the higher rate of abatement induces a higher level of environmental services 
and therefore 0ννφ > .  Moreover the two policy tools reinforce each other, i.e. 
0uνφ > , and this positive interaction means that the marginal efficiency of emissions 
realizations increases with the intensity of the undertaken abatement as a high quality 
environment can be more easily damaged than the low quality. Additionally, we 
assume that the Inada conditions, which guarantee that the optimal strategies are 
nonnegative, holds true, i.e.  
                      
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
0
lim , ,        lim , 0
lim , 0,          lim ,
u u
u u
u u
u uν ν
ν ν
φ ν φ ν
φ ν φ ν
→ →∞
→ →∞
=∞ =
= =∞
                 (20a) 
The utility functions the two players want to maximize defined as follows:  
Player 1, the polluter, derive instantaneous utility, on one hand from their emissions 
which gives rise to increasing and convex costs ( )C u . On the other hand, a high stock 
of good environmental quality incur compliance costs and the induced disutility is 
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described by the increasing function ( )D X . With the above assumptions, player’s 1 
present value of utility is described by the following functional 
                              ( ) ( ) ( )11
0
,
t
J e u D X C u dt
ρ φ ν
∞
−  = − − ∫                      (21) 
Player 2, the group of a high quality environmental services enjoyers, derive utility 
( )Xυ from the quality of environmental state ( )X t , but also from their abatement at 
intensity ν , which is described by the function ( )A ν . For the utilities ( )Xυ  and 
( )A ν  we assume that are monotonically increasing functions with decreasing 
marginal returns, i.e., ( ) ( )0,   0X Aυ ν′ ′> >  and ( ) ( )0,   0X Aυ ν′′ ′′< < . So, player’s 
2 utility function is defined, in its additively separable form, as: 
                                 ( ) ( )22
0
t
J e X A dt
ρ υ ν
∞
−  = + ∫                                      (22) 
5.1 Nash Equilibrium  
In this section we calculate the Nash equilibrium of the pollution differential 
game. The concept of open loop Nash equilibrium is based on the fact that every 
player’s strategy is the best reply to the opponent’s exogenously given strategy. 
Obviously, equilibrium holds if both strategies are simultaneously best replies. 
Following Dockner et al (2000), we formulate the current value Hamiltonians 
for both players, as follows 
             ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 , ,H u D X C u G X uφ ν λ φ ν= − − + −  
            ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 ,H X A G X uυ ν µ φ ν= + + −  
The first order conditions, for the maximization problem, are the following system of 
differential equations for both players: 
First, the maximized Hamiltonians are 
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                       ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 , 0u
H
u C u
u
λ φ ν
∂ ′= − − =
∂
                               (23) 
                              ( ) ( )2 , 0H A uνν µφ ν
ν
∂ ′= − =
∂
                                     (24) 
and second, the costate variables are defined by the equations 
  ( ) ( )11 1
H
G X D X
X
λ ρ λ λ ρ
∂  ′ ′= − = − + ∂
ɺ                           (25) 
              ( ) ( )22 2
H
G X X
X
µ ρ µ µ ρ υ
∂  ′ ′= − = − − ∂
ɺ                         (26) 
The Hamiltonian of the player 1, 1H , is concave in the control u  as far as long 1λ<  
and is guaranteed by the assumptions on the signs of the derivatives, i.e. 
0,   0uu ννφ φ< >  and from the decreasing marginal returns on the polluters’ utilities, 
i.e. ( ) ( )0,   0X Aυ ν′′ ′′< < . Optimality condition (23) implies that the adjoint 
variable λ  is positive, only in the case for which the polluter’s marginal utility uφ  
exceeds the marginal costs, since (23) implies that:     
    ( ) ( )( ) ( ), ,u uu C u uλ φ ν φ ν′= −  . 
 
Proposition 3. The shadow price of the environmental state is positive only if the 
marginal utility exceeds the marginal costs stemming from emissions realizations. 
The player’s 1 Hamiltonian is concave in the control as the shadow price is less than 
one, 1λ< . 
 
In the next subsection we explore the possibility of the limit cycle equilibrium. 
5.2. Periodic solutions 
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In this subsection we explore whether periodic solutions are possible, starting with 
steady state and stability analysis of necessary conditions. As it is clear the differential 
game analysed here becomes with two controls, ( ),u ν and one state variable X . 
Therefore the Jacobian matrix is the following 3 3×  matrix 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
2
, ,
      0
0
X X X
u u
X G X
J G X D X G X
X
G X X G X
X
φ ν φ ν
λ µ
λ µ
λ λ λ
λ ρ
λ µ
µ υ ρ
µ µ µ
λ µ
 ∂ ∂ ∂    ∂ ∂    ′ ∂ ∂ ∂ − −    ∂ ∂    ∂ ∂ ∂     ′′ ′′ ′= = − − −   ∂ ∂ ∂    ′′ ′′ ′− − −    ∂ ∂ ∂       ∂ ∂ ∂  
ɺ ɺ ɺ
ɺ ɺ ɺ
ɺ ɺ ɺ
 
which also gives: ( ) ( )1 2tr       J G Xρ ρ ′= + −  and 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 2 2
1
,
det      
,
             
u
J G X G X G X G X D X G X
u
G X X G X
φ ν
ρ ρ λ ρ
λ
φ ν
µ υ ρ
µ
∂
′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′= − − − + − −
∂
∂
′′ ′′ ′− + −
∂
According to Feichtinger and Novak (1994) (Lemma 4.1) and Wirl (1997) 
(Proposition 4) the existence of a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues requires that 
the following conditions are satisfied: 
                ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tr    0,   det    0,   0,   det        tr  J J w J w J> > > =  
where coefficient w  is the result of the sum of the following determinants  
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1
2
1
2
2
1 2
,
0
0
,
           
, ,
    
u
G XG X
w
G X
G X D X G X
u
G X
G X X G X
u u
G X G X D X G X X
φ ν
ρ
λ
ρ
λ ρ
φ ν
µ
µ υ ρ
φ ν φ ν
ρ ρ λ µ υ
λ µ
∂ ′′ −−
= + +∂ ′−′′ ′′ ′− − −
∂
′ −
+ =∂
′′ ′′ ′− − −
∂ ∂     ′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= − − + − +     ∂ ∂
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From now on the crucial condition for cyclical strategies (precisely for Hopf 
bifurcations to occur) is that  
                        
( )
( )
det  
      0,           
tr  
J
w w
J
> =  
which after simple algebraic calculations (see in the appendix B) reduces to  
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
1 2
2
, ,
G X
u u
G X D X G X X
ρ ρ ρ ρ
φ ν φ ν
λ ρ µ υ ρ
λ µ
 ′+ − = 
∂ ∂   ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + +   ∂ ∂
                         
We specify the functions of the game as follows: a diffusion process for the renewable 
resource growth function, that is ( ) ( )1G X RX X= − , a Cobb–Douglas  type function 
for the function that affects the environmental state, ( ),u uγφ ν ν= , and the utility 
function stemming from the abatement effort on behalf player’s 2 in the form 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1A ξν ν ξ−=Γ− − . Note that the utility function ( )A ν  with 0Γ>  and 
( )0,1ξ ∈  exhibits constant relative risk aversion in the sense of Arrow–Pratt measure 
of risk aversion. The cost functions are simply linear costs, i.e. the polluter’s 
compliance costs is ( )D x Dx=  , while the player’s 1 emissions’ realization cost in 
the linear fashion ( )C u Cu= , as well. Moreover, the utility the second player enjoys 
from the existing environmental quality as ( )X Xυ υ= , Note that all the involved 
coefficients, i.e. the intrinsic growth rate R  and the slopes ,  D υ  and C  are positive 
real numbers, but ( )0,1γ ∈  and 0Γ>  and ( )0,1ξ ∈ , as already mentioned. 
With the above specifications the following result holds true. 
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Proposition 4 
A necessary condition for cyclical strategies in the game between the polluters and 
the high quality environment enjoyers, as described above, is the high environmental 
state enjoyers to be more impatient than the polluters. 
Proof:  See in Appendix A. 
 
5.3. The linear example 
In this subsection we assume linearity of the model, but this assumption makes 
economically sense. Linear state games, as it is showed by Dockner et al (2000), have 
the important property that an open loop Nash equilibrium is Markov perfect and the 
optimal value functions are linear with respect to the state variables. 
We specify the following functions of the game to be in the form: 
i. the environmental growth function is exponential i.e., in the form 
( )G X Xω= ⋅ , where ω  is the growth rate,  
ii. the polluter’s disutility function, ( )D X , stemming from the compliance 
costs, in the form ( )D X D X= ⋅ and finally 
iii. the polluter’s cost stemming from emission’s realizations in the form 
( )C u C u= ⋅  
All the constants involved are positive numbers, that is ,  ,     0D Cω > . From the 
environmental quality enjoyers side, the functions that maximized are specified linear, 
i.e. the utilities arising from the high quality environmental stock and abatement are 
written as ( ) ( )X X tυ υ= ⋅  and ( ) ( )A A tν ν= ⋅  respectively. 
After the above simplified specifications the canonical system of equations 
(23) - (26) can be rewritten as follows: 
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                              ( ) ( )1 1 , 0u
H
u C
u
λ φ ν
∂
= − − =
∂
                                        (27) 
                             ( )2 , 0H A uνµφ ν
ν
∂
= − =
∂
                                               (28) 
                            [ ]11 1
H
D
X
λ ρ λ λ ρ ω
∂
= − = − +
∂
ɺ                                        (29) 
                            [ ]22 2
H
X
µ ρ µ µ ρ ω υ
∂
= − = − −
∂
ɺ                                      (30) 
and the limiting transversality conditions has to hold 
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2lim 0,     lim 0t t
t t
e X t t e X t t
ρ ρλ µ− −
→∞ →∞
= =                                (31) 
The analytical expressions of the adjoint variables ( ),  λ µ , solving equations  (29)-
(30), are respectively: 
                              ( ) ( )1 1
1
tD
t e
ρ ω
λ
ρ ω
−= + Ω
− +
                                             (32)         
                              ( ) ( )2 2
2
t
t e
ρ ωυ
µ
ρ ω
−=− + Ω
− +
                                        (33) 
In order the transversality conditions to satisfied it is convenient to choose the 
constant steady state values, and therefore the adjoint variables collapses to the 
following constants 
                        
1 2
,     
D υ
λ µ
ρ ω ρ ω
−
= =
− −
                                         (34) 
To ensure certain signs for the adjoints (34) we impose another condition on the 
discount rates, which claim that discount rates are greater than the resource’s growth, 
i.e. we impose the condition 
               ,      1, 2i iρ ω> =  
thus, the constant adjoint variables has the negative and positive signs respectively,i.e, 
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1 2
0,     0
D υ
λ µ
ρ ω ρ ω
−
= < = >
− −
 
The above condition seems to be restrictive but can be justified as otherwise optimal 
solutions do not exist. Indeed, choosing 2ρ ω< , the government’s discount rate to be 
lower than the environmental growth rate, their objective functional becomes 
unbounded in the case they choose to send out no emissions. Similarly, choosing the 
government’s discount rate lower than the growth rate the associated adjoint variable 
λ  becomes a positive quantity in the long run. As a shadow price is implausible to be 
positive for optimal solutions, the above reasoning is sufficient for the assumption  
,    1, 2i iρ ω> = . 
Once the concavity of the Hamiltonians, with respect to the strategies, for both 
players is satisfied the first order conditions guarantee its maximization. Now, we 
choose the function’s ( ),uφ ν  specification, i.e. the specification of the damage 
function. This function is depending on the intensity of emissions and also depending 
on the abatement actions undertaken by the social planner. We choose a similar to 
Cobb – Douglas production function specification, which characterized by constant 
elasticities, and is in the following form 
                                    ( ),u uσ ζφ ν ν=       0 1σ ζ< < <  
The rest of the paper is devoted to the calculations of the explicit formulas at the Nash 
equilibrium. 
5.2. Optimal Nash Strategies 
Applying first order conditions for the chosen specification function  
                         ( ) 1,           
1 1
u
C C
u uσ ζφ ν σ ν
λ λ
−= ⇔ =
− −
                                (35) 
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                           ( ) 1,                A Au uσ ζνφ ν ζ ν
µ µ
−= ⇔ =                              (36) 
The combination of (35) and (36), using the Cobb–Douglas type of specification, 
reveals an existing interrelationship between the strategies, i.e. 
    ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
* * * * * *,                    
1 1
Cu A C
u u u
A
σ ζ ν ζµ
φ ν ν ν
σ λ ζµ σ λ
= ⇔ = ⇔ =
− −
            (37) 
Expression (37) now predicts the interrelationship between the player’s Nash 
strategies, for which the result of comparison between them is dependent on the 
constant parameters and on the constant adjoint variables, as well. 
Substituting back (37) into (36) we are able to find the analytical expressions 
of the strategies, after the following algebraic calculations. Expression (36) now 
becomes: 
              ( )
( ) ( )
1 11 1
1
*
1 1
C C
u
A A A
ζ ζζ ζ
σ ζ ζµ µζ µζ
σ λ σ λ
− −− − −
+ −                = =                − −      
 
and from the latter the analytical expressions for the equilibrium strategies is derived 
in a more comparable form now: 
                                 
( )
1
1 1
*
1
C
u
A
ζ ζ
σ ζ σ ζµζ
σ λ
− −
+ − + −     =    −  
                          (38) 
                              
( )
1
1 1
*
1
C
A
σ σ
σ ζ σ ζζµ
ν
σ λ
−
+ − + −     =    −  
                             (39) 
Further substitutions in the equation of the resources accumulation, X X uσ ζω ν= −ɺ , 
yield the following steady state value of the environmental quality stock  
                                
( )
1 11
1
ss CX
A
σ ζ
σ ζ σ ζζµ
ω λ σ
−
+ − + −     =    −  
                      (40) 
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We summarize the above discussion in a proposition. 
 
Proposition 5:  
Assuming the function which damages the environmental quality to exhibit constant 
elasticity and all the other functions to be linear, then the pollution game yields 
constant optimal Nash strategies. The analytical expressions of the strategies are given 
by (38) and (39) for the enjoyer and the polluters respectively. The steady state value 
of the environmental quality stock is given by the expression (40). 
 
5.3. The Value Functions 
In this section we compute the analytical expressions for the values of 
objective functions of the players. For this purpose we make use the constancy of the 
strategies (38), (39) computed above. We denote the pair of the constant strategies as 
( ),u ν . Note that constant strategies, leads to a constant function ( ),uφ φ ν=  which 
is the aforementioned damage function that reduces the environmental quality. The 
equation of the environmental quality state, now can be solved explicitly with the 
following analytical solution  
                           ( ) 0 tX t X eω
φ φ
ω ω
  = − +   
                             (41) 
0X  is the initial stock of the environmental quality. Note that expression (41) leads us 
to assume a sufficiently high initial stock of resources, specifically 0X φ ω≥ , in 
order to satisfy the non-negativity condition ( ) 0X t > . 
The earlier computed constant strategies and the linearity assumption of the 
value functionals for both government and polluters, gives us the advantage to 
calculate a linear integral. Thus, for the value function of player 1, we have: 
26 
 
( ) ( )11
1 0
1 t
J C u D e X t dt
ρφ
ρ
∞
−= − ⋅ − ∫                  (42) 
The value of the integral in (42) can be computed, giving 
( )
( )
1 1 0
1 10
t X
e X t dt
ρ ρ φ
ρ ρ ω
∞
− −=
−∫  
The polluters’ value function (42) now takes the following form: 
0
1
1 1 1 1
1
DXD Cu
J
φ
ρ ρ ω ρ ρ ω
  = + − −   − − 
                     (43)  
which is again a constant. 
Similarly, thanks to the model’s linearity, the government’s value function can 
be calculated analytically yielding the following constant expression: 
( )
( )
2 0 0
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1
,    
X XA
J A J
υ ρ φ υυφ ν
ν
ρ ρ ω ρ ρ ω ρ ρ ω
 −  = + =− + +  − − − 
        (44) 
 
6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the dynamics of pollution 
together with the actions undertaken for counter pollution. For this purpose we setup 
firstly a model of environmental pollution management and secondly a game between 
the polluters and the enjoyers of environmental services. For the first model of high 
quality environmental services management we make as basic assumption, that the 
environment may serve as an input to the production of conventional goods and also 
the environment itself may provide services enjoyed by the people.  
In the management model setup the state variables are the environmental 
quality and the stock of pollutants, as well. In the analysis of the solution we explore 
not only the restricted case of the saddle point equilibrium, but we enrich the 
equilibrium space with the wider class of the limit cycles, applying the Hopf’s 
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bifurcation theorem. We found, in the case of the saddle point the necessary condition 
is the decreasing abatement, while in the case of increasing abatement the result is the 
richer limit cycle equilibrium. Moreover, following numerical analysis, we found 
numerically the region for which the two dimensional stable manifold of the limit 
cycle exists. 
In the second model, the crucial assumption made is not the traditional one in 
which the environment is damaged only from the pollutants accumulation. Instead, we 
claim the function which damages the environmental services is not only affected 
positively by the pollutants accumulation but is affected negatively by the abatement 
effort undertaken by the second group of players. The two players, involved in the 
differential game, maximize their own utilities subject to a common equation of 
motion of the environmental state. Player 1 is the group of polluters which damage 
the environmental quality emitting pollutants at an instant intensity ( )u t , but they 
suffer from the compliance costs as well as from the costs of emission realizations. 
Player 2 is every group of pollutants wipers which they derive utility form the clean 
environment but also utility from their abatement effort ( )( )A tν .  
Considering the environment’s equation of motion we assume that the 
environmental quality grows at an exponential rate as well as with the diffusion 
process and also we assume the damage function is in the form of a Cobb–Douglas 
with constant elasticities. Finally, in the game, we set as instrument variables the 
intensity of emissions on behalf the player 1 and the abatement effort on behalf the 
group that abates. 
The game analyzed here has the important property of the state separability. 
Like linear quadratic games state separable differential games exhibit a special 
structure which allows an analytical characterization of Nash solutions. Moreover, 
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state separable games have the important property that the Nash equilibrium is 
Markov perfect solutions. 
In the solution process and under some simplifications we found the analytical 
expressions of the induced strategies for both players. The equilibrium analysis 
reveals an important interrelationship between the strategies which are presented here 
in a comparable form. Finally, for the game model we found the value functions for 
both players which are, as the strategies, dependent only on the model parameters, 
hence time consistent. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of proposition 4.1. 
With the specifications, given in subsection 5.2, one can compute  
( ) ( )1 2G X R X′ = − , ( ) 2G X R′′ =− , ( ) 1,u u uγφ ν γ −= , ( ),u uγνφ ν = , ( )C u C′ = , 
( ) 2A ξν ν −′ = , ( )D X D′ = , ( )Xυ υ′ =  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 0      1 ,       1u
H
u C u u C
u
γλ φ ν λ γ ν−
∂ ′= ⇔ − = ⇔ − =
∂
     ( ).1Α  
( ) ( ) 22 0      ,       H A u uγ ξνν µφ ν µ ν
ν
−∂ ′= ⇔ = ⇔ =
∂
                        ( ).2Α  
Combining ( ).1Α  and ( ).2Α  the optimal strategies take the following forms 
                      
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )2 1 1 1
1 1 1 1*
1
C
u
ξ ξ γ
γ ξ
µ
γ λ
 − + − − 
 − + − − 
 
 =  −  
( ).3Α ,     
                    
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )( )1 1 1
1 1 1 1*
1
C
γ γ ξ
γ γ ξ
ν µ
γ λ
 + − − 
 − + − − 
 
 =  −  
   ( ).4Α  
and the optimal harvesting becomes 
            ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1* *,
1
C
u
γ ξ γ ξ
γ ξ
φ ν µ
γ λ
 − + − − 
 − + − − 
 
 =  −  
                ( ).5Α  
with the following partial derivatives 
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )( )
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
* *
1 1
1 1 1 1
, 1
       
1 1 1 1
C
u
γ ξ γ ξ
γ ξ
µ
γ λ γ ξφ
λ λ ξ γ
φ ν γ ξ
λ ξ γ
 − + − − 
 − + − − 
 
 
 − −∂  = =
∂ − + − −
−
=
− + − −
     ( ).6Α  
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2
* *
1 1
1 1 1
, 1
       
1 1 1
C
u
γ ξ γ ξ
γ ξ
µ
γ λφ
µ λ ξ γ
φ ν
µ ξ γ
 − + − − 
 − + − − 
 
 
 −∂ − = =
∂ + − −
−
=
+ − −
    ( ).7Α  
Both derivatives ( ).6Α , ( ).7Α  are negatives due to the assumptions on the parameters 
( ),    0,1γ ξ ∈  and on the signs of derivates, that is 
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( ) ( )0,  0,  0,  0u x D xνφ φ υ′ ′> > > > , which ensures the positive sign of the adjoints 
,  λ µ . 
Condition 
( )
( )
det  
     
tr  
J
w
J
=  now becomes  
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 22G X G X G X
φ φ
ρ ρ ρ ρ λρ µρ
λ µ
∂ ∂ ′ ′′ ′′+ − = +  ∂ ∂
, which after substituting the 
values from ( ).6Α ,  ( ).7Α  and making the rest of algebraic manipulations, finally 
yields (at the steady states) 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( )1 2 1 2 1 2
1
,
1 2 0
1 1 1
u G X D
G X
D G X
φ ν
ρ γ ξ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ξ γ ρ
∞ ∞
 ′′    ′− − − + − =  ′+ − − + −  
( ).8Α    
Where we have set 
( )11
D
G X D
λ
λ ρ
=
′− − −
 stemming from the adjoint equation 
( )( ) ( )1 G X D Xλ λ ρ ′ ′= − −ɺ , which at the steady states reduces into 
( ) ( )( )1D X G Xλ ρ′ ′= − . 
Condition 0w>  after substitution of the values from ( ).6Α ,  ( ).7Α  becomes 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
2
1 2
1
,
1 1 0
1 1 1
u G X D
w G X
G X D
φ ν
ρ ρ γ ξ
ξ γ ρ
 ′′ −  ′= − + − + >   ′+ − − + −  
      ( ).9Α  
The division of ( ).8Α  by 1ρ  yields 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( )2 2 1 2
1 1
,
1 2 0
1 1 1
u G X D
G X
D G X
φ ν ρ
γ ξ ρ ρ ρ
ξ γ ρ ρ
∞ ∞
 ′′    ′− − − + − =  ′+ − − + −  
( ).10Α  
The sum ( ).9Α +( ).10Α  must be positive, thus after simplifications and taking into 
account, at the steady state, that ( ) ( ),u G Xφ ν∞ ∞ = , we have: 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
2
1 2
2
1 1 1 1
G X G X G X
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ξ γ
−  ′′ ′> −  + − − 
 and the result 2 1ρ ρ>  follows 
from the strict concavity of the logistic growth 0G′′ < . 
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Appendix B 
Proof that the bifurcation condition
( )
( )
det  
      
tr  
J
w
J
=  ( ).1B  can be written as:  
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
1 2
2
, ,
G X
u u
G X D X G X X
ρ ρ ρ ρ
φ ν φ ν
λ ρ µ υ ρ
λ µ
 ′+ − = 
∂ ∂   ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + +   ∂ ∂  
( ).1B
 
Until now we have: 
( ) ( )1 2tr       J G Xρ ρ ′= + −
       
( ).2B
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 2 2
1
,
det      
,
             
u
J G X G X G X G X D X G X
u
G X X G X
φ ν
ρ ρ λ ρ
λ
φ ν
µ υ ρ
µ
∂
′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′= − − − + − −
∂
∂
′′ ′′ ′− + −
∂
          
( ).3B
 ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
2
1 2
, ,u u
w G X G X D X G X X
φ ν φ ν
ρ ρ λ µ υ
λ µ
∂ ∂     ′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= − − + − +     ∂ ∂
          ( ).4B  
First we multiply ( ).2B  by ( ).4B , and 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
2
1 2
2
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2
, ,
,
,
G X
u u
G X G X D X G X X
G X G X
u
G X G X D X
u
G X G X X
ρ ρ
φ ν φ ν
ρ ρ λ µ υ
λ µ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
φ ν
ρ ρ λ
λ
φ ν
ρ ρ µ υ
µ
 ′+ − ⋅ 
 ∂ ∂      ′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′− − + − + =      ∂ ∂ 
    ′ ′= + − − −     
∂   ′ ′′ ′′− + − + −   ∂
∂   ′ ′′ ′′− + − +   ∂
 
          ( ).5B  
Equating ( ).3B =( ).5B
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 2
1
2
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2
1
,
,
             
,
,
      
u
G X G X G X G X D X G X
u
G X X G X
G X G X
u
G X G X D X
u
G X G X X
G X G X
φ ν
ρ ρ λ ρ
λ
φ ν
µ υ ρ
µ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
φ ν
ρ ρ λ
λ
φ ν
ρ ρ µ υ
µ
ρ
∂
′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′− − − + − −
∂
∂
′′ ′′ ′− + − =
∂
    ′ ′= + − − −     
∂   ′ ′′ ′′− + − + −   ∂
∂   ′ ′′ ′′− + − + ⇔   ∂
′ ′⇔ − ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1 2 1 2
1
2
     
,
     
,
                                 
G X
G X G X
u
G X D X
u
G X X
ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
φ ν
ρ λ
λ
φ ν
ρ µ υ
µ
   ′− =   
    ′ ′= + − − −     
∂  ′′ ′′− + − ∂
∂  ′′ ′′− + ⇔ ∂  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
2 3
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2
  
, ,
            
  
G X G X G X G X G X
u u
G X D X G X X
G X G X G X
G X G X G X G X
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
φ ν φ ν
ρ λ ρ µ υ
λ µ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
        ′ ′ ′ ′ ′⇔ + − − − − − =         
∂ ∂   ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + + ⇔   ∂ ∂
   ′ ′ ′⇔ + − + − + −   
    ′ ′ ′ ′− + + −   
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
3
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
, ,
      
2
, ,
u u
G X D X G X X
G X
u u
G X D X G X X
φ ν φ ν
ρ λ ρ µ υ
λ µ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
φ ν φ ν
ρ λ ρ µ υ
λ µ
 = 
∂ ∂   ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + + ⇔   ∂ ∂
′⇔ + − =
∂ ∂   ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + +   ∂ ∂
 
which is the condition for cyclical strategies as in the main text. 
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